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Brexit	thinking	poisoned	the	government’s	response
to	COVID-19
Having	formally	left	the	EU,	the	UK’s	response	to	COVID-19	has	revealed	its	eagerness	to	go	it	alone,	which	has
had	dire	consequences,	writes	Jonathan	Hopkin	(LSE).	He	argues	that	Brexit	thinking	stymied	the	government’s
response	to	the	virus,	at	a	great	human	cost.
On	the	31st	of	January,	Britain	formally	left	the	European	Union.	Although	it	remains	subject	to	EU	law	for	the	rest
of	2020	at	least,	its	response	to	the	Coronavirus	pandemic	has	already	revealed	an	eagerness	to	go	it	alone,
rejecting	participation	in	an	EU	initiative	for	the	procurement	of	medical	equipment	and	imposing	lockdown	far	later
than	comparable	countries.	This	divergence	has	had	stark	consequences:	by	the	end	of	May,	Britain	had	more
deaths	from	COVID-19	than	any	country	in	Europe,	and	the	second-highest	per	capita	death	rate	in	the	world.	This,
despite	the	virus	taking	hold	in	Britain	significantly	later	than	in	Italy	or	Spain,	the	first	countries	to	suffer	a	sustained
outbreak.	What	has	this	got	to	do	with	Brexit?	Actually,	quite	a	lot.	Brexit	thinking,	and	indeed	the	immediate
material	consequences	of	that	decision,	stymied	the	government’s	response	to	the	virus,	at	a	great	human	cost.
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The	UK	government’s	initial	approach	to	the	crisis	was	both	lethargic	and	confusing.	With	Italy	already	moving	into
lockdown,	government	scientists	went	on	the	air	to	talk	about	allowing	‘herd	immunity’	(allowing	most	people	to
catch	the	virus)	to	solve	the	problem,	whilst	Prime	Minister	Boris	Johnson	himself	boasted	about	shaking	hands
with	Coronavirus	patients	in	hospital.	This	was	typical	of	the	iconoclastic,	anti-system	leadership	style	Johnson	has
brought	to	British	politics,	imitating	Trump	and	others.	Only	when	the	full	scale	of	the	outbreak	in	Italy	became
evident	did	the	government	begin	to	advocate	voluntary	social	distancing,	which	was	a	complete	failure,	as	mass
events	continued	and	workers	crammed	into	packed	buses	and	trains.	Finally,	the	government	bowed	to	the
inevitable	and	followed	the	rest	of	Europe	into	lockdown,	but	according	to	later	estimates	1.5	million	Britons	had
already	been	infected	with	COVID-19	at	that	point.
What	has	this	got	to	do	with	Brexit?	Perhaps	surprisingly,	the	problem	did	not	seem	to	revolve	around	the
scepticism	towards	‘experts’	that	leading	Brexiters	such	as	Michael	Gove	had	expressed	during	the	EU	referendum
campaign.	Instead,	the	Johnson	government	took	advice	from	a	select	group	of	scientists	and	modellers	who
advised	that	acting	too	quickly	would	be	counter-productive.	Instead,	the	government	could	‘smooth	the	curve’	of
infection	with	sophisticated	measures	of	social	engineering	inspired	by	the	‘nudge’	movement	in	behavioural
science,	which	in	the	first	instance	meant	little	more	than	banning	school	trips	and	cruises.	It	was	only	when	a
leading	epidemiologist	in	the	government	team	updated	his	models	to	reflect	the	high	rates	of	hospitalization	of
COVID-19	patients	in	Italy	that	Johnson	finally	relented	and	ordered	a	full	lockdown,	in	the	last	week	of	March.
This	chain	of	events	is	perhaps	unsurprising	in	the	context	of	a	Brexiter	administration	determined	to	go	it	alone
rather	than	learn	lessons	from	European	neighbours.	It	was	blindingly	obvious	from	early	March	that	the	pandemic
was	overwhelming	a	healthcare	system	that	ranked	among	the	best	in	the	world,	in	one	of	Europe’s	richest	regions:
Lombardy.	Britain,	with	one	of	the	lowest	numbers	of	intensive	care	beds	in	Europe,	was	hardly	better	placed	than
Italy	to	cope	with	the	outbreak.	Yet	Boris	Johnson	insisted	that	‘what	is	happening	in	other	countries	doesn’t
necessarily	mirror	what	is	happening	in	the	UK’.	The	fact	that	nobody	in	government	seemed	to	be	talking	with
experts	in	other	countries,	is	symptomatic	of	the	insular	thinking	that	underpins	the	Brexit	project.	But	it
also	reflects	the	all-consuming	challenges	of	leaving	the	European	Union,	which	distracted	the	government	from	the
pandemic.	The	Prime	Minister,	elected	on	a	promise	to	‘Get	Brexit	Done’	appeared	to	take	a	break	from	day-to-day
affairs	once	the	UK	formally	exited	the	EU	on	31st	January,	and	did	not	attend	the	first	five	meetings	of	the
government’s	emergency	committee	(COBRA)	set	up	to	monitor	the	pandemic.
In	the	midst	of	a	once	in	a	century	public	health	crisis,	Brexit	threatens	to	make	things	worse.	Even	at	a	historic	low
point	in	relations	between	European	Union	member	states,	there	has	been	close	cooperation	and	a	fair	degree	of
generosity	helping	the	hardest-hit	countries	secure	medical	supplies	and	even	share	hospital	facilities.	Britain,
meanwhile,	chose	to	rely	on	Brexit-friendly	forms	of	international	aid,	such	as	procuring	ventilators	from	Euroskeptic
vacuum	manufacturer	Dyson,	or	from	the	volatile	President	of	the	United	States.	This	equipment	failed	to
materialize.	Without	a	substantial	manufacturing	sector	of	its	own,	Britain	was	entirely	dependent	on	international
trade	to	secure	protective	equipment	for	healthcare	workers.	But	many	exporters	earmarked	production	for
domestic	needs,	or	funnelled	supplies	to	the	highest	bidder,	often	the	United	States.
And	all	of	this	happened	before	Britain	had	fully	left	Europe.	Despite	still	benefitting	from	its	continued	participation
in	the	EU’s	pandemic	warning	system	(the	Early	Warning	and	Response	System),	the	UK	government	declined	to
request	continued	membership	after	Brexit,	despite	requests	from	public	health	authorities.	Neither	has	the	UK
shown	any	interest	in	maintaining	reciprocal	access	to	healthcare	to	nationals	of	EU	countries	under	the	European
Health	Insurance	Card	(EHIC)	scheme.	Instead,	from	2021,	European	Union	migrants	to	the	United	Kingdom	can
expect	to	pay	the	health	surcharge	of	£624	($774)	per	annum,	a	policy	designed	to	deal	with	the	alleged	problem	of
‘health	tourism’	(EU	migrants	visiting	the	UK	solely	to	exploit	free	healthcare).	Yet	migration	from	the	EU	has	been
a	key	source	of	essential	workers,	including	in	the	healthcare	sector,	and	EU	migrants	are	mostly	young	and	make
few	demands	on	the	health	system.	A	policy	of	discouraging	migration	is	the	last	thing	a	country	faced	with	a
massive	healthcare	crisis	needs.	Yet	the	government	has	continued	to	make	policy	on	the	basis	of	a	frequently
debunked	myth	that	leaving	the	EU	would	make	it	easier	to	finance	the	National	Health	Service	and	reduce
demands	on	it.	Fittingly,	one	of	the	consultants	who	cared	for	Boris	Johnson	during	his	hospitalization	for	COVID1-
19	was	an	Italian	national.
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The	UK	government’s	official	position	remains	that	it	will	not	seek	an	extension	to	the	transition	period	and	will	be
able	to	negotiate	a	Free	Trade	Agreement	(FTA)	by	the	end	of	2020.	This	was	always	an	ambitious,	if	not	quixotic,
plan,	given	the	many	years	such	negotiations	usually	take,	but	in	a	world	preoccupied	with	the	worst	pandemic	for	a
century	and	the	worst	economic	crisis	since	the	Second	World	War	it	has	become	simply	impossible.	Refusing	to
extend	means	leaving	the	European	Union	next	year	with	no	deal,	putting	up	tariff	barriers	and	checks	on	every
port,	instituting	new	trade	rules	with	the	entire	world,	after	a	year	in	which	GDP	is	predicted	to	fall	by	potentially	up
to	a	third.	Far	from	seeking	to	mitigate	the	economic	effects	of	the	pandemic,	some	appear	to	see	the	pandemic	as
an	opportunity	to	make	the	costs	of	a	no-deal	Brexit	less	visible	in	the	midst	of	a	deep	global	recession.
So	the	Brexit	ship	sails	on.	Predictions	of	economic	and	political	disaster	have	long	been	dismissed	by	Brexiters	as
‘project	fear’.	In	the	context	of	the	most	challenging	year	in	British	history	since	1945,	the	shock	of	Brexit	indeed
begins	to	look	like	the	least	of	our	worries.	But	the	anti-system	culture	of	Brexit	–	a	culture	of	insularity	and	hostility
to	international	cooperation	–	has	undermined	the	fight	against	COVID-19	in	important	ways.	By	the	time	Brexit	is
completed,	the	bulk	of	the	damage	will	already	have	been	done.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	Image	by	European
Parliament:	Some	rights	reserved.
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